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REPRESENTING THE CONDEMNED:
A CRITIQUE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN*
Christine, this won't be an easy letter to write, but it's one I
feel I must write.... I thank you for calling my family and
talking to them. I am very concerned about my Mother and
Barbara. I know it's not much, but all I can do is thank you for
being there for them this next week...
Love & respect,
Billy'
On Thursday, January 25, and Friday, January 26, 1996, the states of
Delaware and Utah executed two more death row inmates. News
accounts signaling the events opened with the gambit, "[j]ust as capital
punishment was becoming somewhat routine, two unusual executions
[are] set for this week - one by hanging, the other by firing
squad.... 2 I thought back once again to the early morning hours of
February 16, 1995, when the State of Texas executed our client.' To us,
it was anything but routine. Unfortunately, in the circus-like race to
execute death row inmates, neither was it unusual.
We stood in the black rainy mist across the walkway from the Walls
Unit in Huntsville, staring at the oldest prison in Texas. Pictures of it
were plastered on the walls of local bars and on the silkscreened
sweatshirts worn by their customers. We stared at the barbed wire, eerie
yellow lights and girded towers manned by armed guards, and we
wondered what purpose had been served by the execution of this fifty-
one year old man. Governor George W. Bush had denied the petition
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1. Excerpt from the final letter written by Billy Conn Gardner to the author on February
11, 1995, shortly before his death. In our final meeting before his death, Billy Gardner waived
his attorney-client privilege with respect to the matters discussed in this essay. This essay is
dedicated to Nettie Gardner and Barbara Gray, Billy Gardner's mother and sister, two of the
forgotten victims of capital punishment.
2. Tony Mauro, Hanging, Firing Squad Executions Set for This Week, USA TODAY, Jan.
22, 1996, News, at 3A.
3. Billy Conn Gardner was represented by Professor Wiseman from February, 1988, until
his death on February 16, 1995. After he graduated from law school, Attorney David Bourne
of the Milwaukee law firm Quarles & Brady remained with her as co-counsel on the case.
Eventually, the firm adopted Gardner as its client as well.
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for executive clemency six hours earlier.4 Like others before him, he
followed the ranks of those governors increasingly unwilling to suffer the
political ramifications of extending clemency to death row inmates.5
There was nothing more we could do as lawyers so we stayed to do
4. In Texas, the Governor, acting in concert with the State Board of Pardons and Parole,
has the ability to commute a death sentence by act of executive clemency. See Daniel T.
Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 569, 605 n.233 and accompanying text (1991). Since 1976, however, not one appeal
for executive clemency on grounds of innocence has succeeded in Texas. As described by one
reporter, the process is one "where decisions are meted out by the governor and a parole
board consisting of political appointees who follow no fixed set of procedures, are reluctant
to second-guess the courts, and are accountable to no one." Susan Blaustein, Witness to
Another Execution, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, May 1994, at 57. See also, Hugo Adam Bedau, The
Decline of Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255,257 (1990-91)
(Despite the diversity in clemency procedures among the states, all "are standardless in
procedure, discretionary in exercise, and unreviewable in result.").
5. During her term of office, Governor Ann W. Richards (1990-94) had granted a
clemency hearing only twice. The first such hearing was ordered for Gary Graham, who is still
alive. The second hearing was ordered for Vietnam Veteran Robert Black in response to a
telephone call from the Vatican. Mr. Black's stay of execution was granted for only 30 days,
however. He was later executed in 1992. See Joan M. Cheever, An Appointment in the Death
House: A Lawyer's Voyage on a Capital Case Comes to an End on an October Night in Texas,
NAT'L. L. J., Nov. 14. 1994, at A16. National data available from the Department of Justice's
Bureau of Justice Statistics suggests that executive clemency has become a rarity. In the
decade 1960 through 1970, for example, when statistics were first collected, death sentences
numbered 1155, and commutations 182. In the decade 1979 through 1988. death sentences
numbered 2535, but there were only 63 commutations. See Bedau, supra note 4, at 264.
Among the reasons offered to explain the decline in grants of clemency in capital cases
is the observation that a governor might commit "political suicide" by granting clemency in
a capital case. See id. at 268. Although there exist some notable exceptions, e.g., Governor
Tony Anaya of New Mexico, who granted commutations to all six persons on death row in
1986, and Governor Richard Celeste of Ohio, who granted clemency in 1991 to 68 individuals,
including eight death row inmates, both were serving final terms in office. See RANDALL
COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 644 (1994).
More recently, when Governor Jim Edgar of Illinois commuted the death sentence to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for Guinevere Garcia on Tuesday, January 16, 1996,
just fourteen hours before her scheduled execution, he realized that political fallout. In a
statement read by his attorney, Governor Edgar reasoned that commutation was justified, not
because Garcia "was a woman, or a battered and sexually abused woman. ... It was just that
it was not right.... as long as other people convicted of more heinous crimes have eluded the
death penalty in Illinois." See Ted Gregory & Christi Parsons, Edgar's Power Halts Execution
of Garcia, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1996, § 1, at 1. His announcement was met with "shock" by
many Republicans in the Illinois General Assembly, who feared "Edgar's move could undercut
the GOP's tough-on-crime campaign efforts in key legislative elections this fall that will
determine which party will run the legislature for the next two years." Some Republicans
even sought to distance themselves from Edgar, commenting publicly that it was "'his decision
and his alone"' and signaled no "'red-letter day' for death penalty opponents. See Rick
Pearson, Edgar's '94 Election Ad Echoes After Clemency, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1996, § 2, at 1,
7. See also, Ted Gregory & Christi Parsons, Garcia's Clemency Stirs Calls for New Laws, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 18, 1996, § 2, at 1, 4.
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what we could as human beings. We stood in the rain, waiting for Billy
Gardner's family to reappear from the Execution Chamber, our purpose
now to lend a quiet dignity to the end of his life. As the moments ticked
by, we stood side by side, saying nothing. The Walls Unit chaplain had
told us that "it always rains in Texas when there's an execution." I
wondered why no one got the picture. I thought with bitter regret about
a criminal justice system which had failed miserably to protect another
of its poor and powerless. It was a system in which we had played a
pivotal role for seven years, but it was too little too late.
Billy Conn Gardner stood convicted of the capital murder of a
cafeteria worker in Dallas, Texas on May 16, 1983.6 The bullet
punctured the worker's liver and she died eleven days later. Before she
died, the victim, Thelma Catherine (Caty) Rowe, identified her assailant
as a man over 6 feet in height with medium-length reddish-blond hair
and a two-inch red goatee. Billy Gardner stood 5 feet, 11 inches tall, but
he had coal black hair and piercing black eyes. He had never worn
facial hair, and no one at trial had been asked to explain the reddish-
blond hair or the red goatee. The only disinterested eyewitness to the
crime was a diminutive custodian from the high school who saw the
assailant for two to four seconds standing outside the back door of the
cafeteria. He stood six to ten feet away and testified that he took no
particular note of the assailant since he thought the man was a school
district worker - "out there with the yard pool or something." He also
described the assailant as having sandy reddish hair and a little red
goatee. His in-court identification of Billy Gardner was based on his
personal assessment of what Gardner would look like with red hair and
a red goatee. Yet he first identified Billy Gardner's picture from a
photographic lineup some three months after the robbery. The police
had shown him the photos while he was lying in a hospital bed suffering
from a sickle cell crisis.
I thought again about all the arguments I had raised - legal
arguments designed to get the state court, the federal district court and
eventually the United States Supreme Court to focus on the fact that the
wrong man stood convicted of Caty Rowe's murder. As defense counsel,
6. Trial transcripts supporting the facts recounted in this essay are on file with the author
and in the Dallas County Courthouse under the case name, State of Texas v. Billy Conn
Gardner, No. F-83-93161-JLR (265th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas). The trial
transcripts were filed on April 26, 1984. Other facts are supported by the transcripts of the
Evidentiary Hearing conducted on October 20, 1988 and continued on December 12 and 13,
1988, before the Honorable John Ovard, 265th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas,
and filed on December 13, 1988.
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we were well aware of the Texas courts' reluctance to deal with post-
conviction claims of actual innocence.7
The damning evidence in Gardner's case, as in all too many which
have preceded his,8 was provided by the state's "star" witness, Melvin
Sanders. In reality, of course, Sanders had few if any stellar qualities.
Melvin Sanders had fingered our client. Melvin Sanders testified at
trial that the robbery was his idea since his wife Paula worked at the
targeted cafeteria. He knew when and where the day's receipts would
be counted. But he testified that he waited in the car while Billy went
in to do the job. In fact, Melvin Sanders cut himself quite a deal before
naming his accomplice. After police successfully prevented Sanders from
getting probation on a pending forgery charge, prompted federal firearms
authorities to file a case against him, Sanders convinced the district
attorney in a nearby community to prosecute him for a distinct robbery,
and threatened to file an action against his wife Paula in the matter,
Sanders capitulated. And he named Billy Gardner because he owed
Billy Gardner about $700 following a drug deal gone bad. In return for
accusing Gardner of murder, Sanders was given testimonial immunity in
the capital murder case, probation on the robbery charge, and dismissal
of the firearms charge. In addition, his wife Paula was never charged in
connection with Caty Rowe's murder. Billy's sister swore before the
court that following Sanders' testimony at trial, she had overheard him
at a restaurant during an adjournment laughing for her benefit about the
fact that he had "pulled off" his testimony.9 Sources tell us Sanders has
since killed himself in a shootout with a bounty hunter because he had
snitched on so many people that he figured he would "buy it" in prison
anyhow.
7. Four death-row inmates in the last four years were found to be innocent and
were released; at least four more have presented to the courts compelling claims of
innocence. But their pleadings have been dismissed repeatedly because Texas law
requires an inmate to produce new evidence of his innocence within thirty days of
his conviction - an impossibly short time for a newly condemned person to procure
trial transcripts (just preparing these often takes the court as long as thirty days), hire
a new lawyer to reinvestigate the case, and file a motion for a new trial.
Blaustein, supra note 4, at 57.
8. See MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE 43-59, 60-76 (1992). In
Chapters 1 and 2 of their book, the authors illustrate both how false testimony which is
deliberately fabricated by witnesses who are coached by the prosecution can convict an
innocent man and how perjured testimony provided by the real assailant can lead to a
defendant's wrongful conviction.
9. See Aff. of Barbara Gray, dated July 7, 1988, filed as Exhibit D in State of Texas v.




The other "star" prosecution witness was Sanders' wife Paula, who
worked at the targeted cafeteria. She had testified at trial that she
simply could not identify the assailant because she only saw the back of
the assailant's hand. Moreover, she was unaware that her husband
Melvin Sanders was planning the robbery. Mr. Gardner's trial counsel
never knew that Paula Sanders, who had worked at the cafeteria for only
three to four months, had run to the cafeteria phone half a dozen times
that afternoon, grabbing the phone before anyone else could answer it
- that she was nervous and upset the whole day of the burglary - and
that she sat for the entire encounter facing the assailant - because they
never questioned any of Paula's co-workers who were present at the
scene and who were listed on the police incident report. Instead they
hired an investigator who talked with police and simply figured Billy
Gardner was "good for" the offense. The investigator never contacted
any witnesses listed on the police incident report because he "only did
what the attorney instructed me to do," and they had given him no
instructions regarding such witnesses. In fact, the investigator never
contacted the fact witnesses at all during the entire course of the trial,
even when it became apparent that they would be called by the State of
Texas. That investigator has since died.
And so, Billy Gardner went to his death proclaiming his innocence
of a crime for which he was "justly" convicted.
A. THE RECURRING PROBLEM OF INNOCENCE
During this century alone, more than 7,000 men and women have
been legally executed in the United States.'0 Two hundred fifty of those
executions have occurred since the United States Supreme Court
reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia.2 Of those, at least
seventy-three (including our client) were executed in Huntsville. 3
10. RADELET, supra note 8, at 19.
11. Jack Hayes, et al., Stolen Lives, LIFE, Oct. 1994, at 64.
12. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
13. When the numbers were tallied by a reporter in 1994, Texas had executed seventy-
two men at Huntsville since 1976. That number represented twice as many executions as
Florida, "the next most productive state in the execution market, and more than three times
as many as in Virginia and Louisiana, which rank third and fourth." The author continued:
"In the last two years, the rate of Texas executions has more than tripled, and the seventeen
men executed in 1993 alone constitute nearly a fourth of those put to death since executions
resumed in Texas in 1982." Blaustein, supra note 4, at 54. See also, David Margolick, Texas
Death Row is Growing, But Fewer Lawyers Will Help, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 1993, § b, at 1,
13. "For as long as anyone can remember, Texas's death row was the nation's largest; it lost
that distinction only because it executed 17 prisoners in 1993 - more than three times as
1996]
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More to the point, however, during that same interim, some fifty-three
capital defendants have been released from death row because of
probable innocence. 4 That number represents nearly 2% of the people
sitting on this nation's death rows."
In October 1994, Life Magazine detailed five of the more recent
occurrences. They included: Andrew Golden, who was released in
many as any other state, and the most here since 1938." Id.
By 1995, statistics indicate that Texas had executed ninety-two persons. The southern
states of Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Texas,
and Virginia account for 226 of the 266 people executed in the United States since 1976. See
Tama Lewin, Who Decides Who Will Die? Even Within States, It Varies, N.Y. TIMEs. Feb. 23,
1995, at Al, A13.
14. Hayes, supra note 11. See also, RADELET, supra note 8, at 282-356. While there
have always been erroneous convictions, some of which resulted in executions, the authors
factually document some thirty-nine situations since 1975-76 where a capital defendant,
sentenced to death, has been released on grounds of innocence. Among those cases
inventoried (including the state of conviction and year of release) were Randall Dale Adams
(Texas, 1989); Jerry Banks (Georgia, 1980): Gary L. Beeman (Ohio, 1979); Jerry D. Bigelow
(California, 1988): Clarence Lee Brandley (Texas, 1990); Anthony Silah Brown (Florida, 1986):
Joseph Green Brown (Florida, 1987); Willie A. Brown and Larry Troy (Florida, 1987); Earl
Patrick Charles (Georgia, 1978); James Creamer (Georgia, 1975): Perry Cobb and Darby
Williams (a/k/a Darby Tillis) (Illinois, 1987); Robert Craig Cox (Florida, 1989): Henry Drake
(Georgia, 1987); Neil Ferber (Pennsylvania, 1986), Charles Ray Giddens (Oklahoma. 1982):
Thomas V. Gladish, Richard Wayne Greer, Ronald B. Keine, Clarence Smith (New Mexico,
1975); Timothy B. Hennis (North Carolina, 1989); Larry Hicks (Indiana, 1980); Anibal
Jaramillo (Florida, 1981); William Riley Jent and Earnest Lee Miller (Florida, 1988); Lawyer
Johnson (Massachusetts, 1982); Wilbert Lee and Freddie Pitts (Florida, 1975): Ralph W.
Lobaugh (Indiana, 1977); Gordon Morris (Texas, 1976); Anthony Ray Peek (Florida, 1987);
Juan F. Ramos (Florida, 1987): James Richardson (Florida, 1989); Johnny Ross (Louisiana,
1981); Bradley P. Scott (Florida, 1991); Charles Smith (Indiana, 1991); Delbert Tibbs (Florida,
1982); Jonathan Charles Treadaway, Jr. (Arizona, 1976).
In addition to this documentation, the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty
in Washington, D.C., listed 51 death row inmates who were freed between 1973 and May,
1994. One of those prisoners, also listed among the Radelet chronicles, was Delbert (the
Reverend) Darby Tillis, a minister who frequently works in the Chicago offices of the Illinois
Coalition Against the Death Penalty. Tillis had been convicted in 1979 for a double murder
and robbery. He protested his innocence at trial, claiming perjured testimony. Eventually,
he was released following a fourth retrial in 1987. Amid the testimony which exonerated him
was that provided by a former assistant Cook County State's Attorney. See James Rowen,
Saved From Execution, He Saves Others, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, May 3, 1995, § A,
at 1, 8.
Another of those prisoners was Joseph Green Brown, now known as Shabaka WaQlimi,
who was released in 1987 after spending fourteen years on Florida's death row. Id. at 8. The
latter appeared with the author at a community brainstorming conference on April 22, 1995
at St. Matthew's CME Church in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
15. Statistics demonstrate that as of April, 1994, there were 2804 men and 44 women
awaiting execution in the United States. See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 5, at 55 (citing
"Decisions of Death" by David Bruck, as updated by the publication Death Row, U.S.A.
(NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.)).
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November 1993 after spending 26 months on Florida's death row for the
1989 murder of his wife-the Florida Supreme Court eventually
concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove her death was
anything but an accident; 6 Walter McMillian, who spent six years on
death row in Alabama for the murder of a dry cleaning store clerk in
1987-he was released on March 2, 1993 when all three prosecution
witnesses finally recanted;" Sonia Jacobs, released from prison in
1992-she spent five years on death row in Florida before her sentence
of execution by electrocution was commuted to life in 198;8s Muneer
Deeb, a Jordanian immigrant who spoke little English and spent eight
years on death row in Texas for the murder of three teenagers-he was
eventually released on January 12, 1993; 9 and finally, there was Kirk
Bloodsworth-after spending ten years on death row in Maryland,
Bloodsworth was released by order of a circuit judge when DNA tests
demonstrated that semen found in the underclothing of the dead child
could not have been his. 20
Since October 1994, when Life published its expose, those numbers
have increased yet again. After spending five years on death row in
Illinois for the 1988 slaying of William Dulin, Joseph Burrows was
released from prison on September 8, 1994.21 Although no physical
evidence had linked Burrows to the crime, he was convicted on the
testimony of two state witnesses who had received lighter sentences in
exchange for their testimony. Later, one of the witnesses confessed that
she alone had killed Dulin, and the other witness recanted his testimony,
claiming he had been coerced by prosecutors and police officers.22
Likewise, Adolph Munson, first sentenced to Oklahoma's death row
in 1984, was acquitted on April 5, 1995 after an appeals court ordered
him retried amid allegations that the police had withheld hundreds of
pages of exculpatory reports and photographs.' More recently, The
16. See Golden v. State, 629 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1993).
17. Hayes, supra note 11, at 66.
18. Id. at 68.
19. Id. at 70.
20. Id. at 72-3.
21. After5 Years, Death Row Inmate is Freed by Another's Confession, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 1994, § A, at 16.
22. Id.
23. See Richard L. Fricker, State Falters in Retrial of Escaped Con, ABA J., June 1995
at 38, 40. An earlier ABA Journal investigation of the Munson case discovered that
information which pointed to another suspect had never been turned over to the defense. See
Richard L. Fricker, Reasonable Doubts, ABA J., December 1993, at 38, 39. Among the
evidence withheld from defense counsel were statements given by three individuals who said
1996]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Chicago Tribune detailed the travails of Rolando Cruz, a man who was
finally released from Illinois' death row on Friday, November 3, 1995,
after having spent 11 years on death row for the murder of a ten-year
old child which he did not commit. Prosecutors had ignored the
conclusion of the Illinois State Police that another man committed the
crime, had ignored the results of their own DNA tests excluding the
defendant, and were finally taken to task when a sheriff's lieutenant
admitted that he and other law enforcement officers had perjured
themselves on the witness stand.24
That these persons were released is a triumph of appellate justice for
them, but an unmistakable sign that the criminal justice system in this
country has not been able to foreclose the inevitability of wrongful
conviction. And, as defense counsel, the inevitability of wrongful
conviction is my nightmare. My client Billy Gardner was not as
fortunate as these, however, and the inevitability of wrongful conviction
has now become my curse.
These people are not just anonymous numbers on someone's tally
sheet of death row inmates; they are victims - every bit as much as the
people whom they were accused of killing. These inmates are people
who should never have been tried or people whose cases were plagued
by reasonable doubt, but who did not have the resources to raise that
reasonable doubt at trial. As I have stated to those persons aghast at the
acquittal of 0. J. Simpson, the tragedy is not that the criminal justice
system works as it should for the rich man; the tragedy is that so often
it does not work as it should for the poor. For Billy Gardner and a
whole host of poor defendants, the system has collapsed. Visit this
nation's death rows; you may spot one or two monied people in Arizona
or Illinois, but they are a rarity. This nation's thirty-eight death rows'
they had seen a white man in the store and a pickup truck parked outside shortly before the
victim disappeared (Munson is black); 165 photographs taken by state investigators, one of
which depicted a bullet hole larger than the .22 caliber slug both the police and the pathologist
identified in the victim's body; and tires removed from Munson's car after he was arrested in
California which were never returned to Oklahoma. Police indicated that a problem with a
commercial airline had made it impossible to return the tires, even though Munson was flown
back to Oklahoma in a private airplane. More importantly, however, photographs and tire-
tread measurements taken at the crime scene clearly suggested the assailants used a pickup
truck. Id. at 39-40.
24. Maurice Possley, The Nicarico Nightmare: Admitted Lie Sinks Cruz Case, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 5, 1995, § 1, at 1, 13. See also, Gera-Lind Kolarik, DNA, Changed Testimony Gain
Acquittal, ABA J., Jan. 1996, at 34-5.
25. As of April, 1994, 36 states had enacted capital punishment. See COYNE &
ENTZEROTH, supra note 5, at 87-90. See also, State of Wisconsin Legislative Reference
[Vol. 79:731
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are populated instead by people like Billy Gardner, whose father and
cousin injected him with heroin at the age of nine to make him a pliant
drug runner, whose father raped his younger sister, and whose mother
was simply too poor to keep the man away from the home or obtain the
necessary rehabilitative help for her son. But there is one other thing to
note as well: the people on death row are disproportionately people of
color. Statistics disclose, for example, that while only 12% of the United
States population is African American, 46% of the death row population
is African American.26
Moreover, nationwide studies reflect overall patterns of racial
discrimination in capital sentencing. One of the most sophisticated
studies was conducted by Professor David C. Baldus, who examined the
Georgia capital sentencing process between 1973 and 1979. He
examined over 2,000 cases and considered 230 non-racial variables. He
found that Georgia defendants who were charged with killing white
persons received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but that
defendants charged with killing black victims received the death penalty
in only 1% of the cases. Put another way, a Georgia defendant charged
with killing a white victim was 4.3 times more likely to receive a death
Bureau, Informational Bulletin 95-1, Capital Punishment in Wisconsin and the Nation, Apr.
1995, at 26-7 (prepared by A. Peter Cannon, Senior Research Analyst). Since 1994, that
number has grown by two. The state of Kansas authorized capital punishment by lethal
injection in 1994 when its governor allowed a bill to become law without her signature. In
March 1995, the state of New York enacted legislation permitting capital punishment by lethal
injection for the murder of a police officer, judge, or other criminal justice official; for contract
and serial killings, torture killings or intentional murder during the course of a felony. See id.
at 25. Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have yet to follow suit, although
legislation is currently pending in Wisconsin. See, e.g., S.B.1, 1995-96 Legislature, 1995 Wis.
Laws 11.
26. According to the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. statistics on the
death row population in this country as of April, 1994, there were 1131 black inmates and 287
inmates who were classified as either Asian, Latino, Native American or "Unknown." These
figures compare with the 1427 white inmates on death row and do not account for the death
row inmates in the United States military (8) or in federal prisons (5). See COYNE &
ENTZEROTH, supra note 5, at 87-90. Justice Marshall also noted this disparity: "A total of
3,859 persons have been executed since 1930, of whom 1,751 were white and 2,066 were
Negro. Of the executions, 3,334 were for murder; 1,664 of the executed murderers were white
and 1,630 were Negro; 455 persons, including 48 whites and 405 Negroes, were executed for
rape. It is immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than whites in
proportion to their percentage of the population. Studies indicate that while the higher rate
of execution among Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of
racial discrimination." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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sentence than a defendant charged with killing a black victim. Thus, the
Baldus study concluded that black defendants who kill white victims have
the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty.2 7
Beyond the Baldus study, there have been numerous others,2"
including a nationwide study conducted by Jim Henderson and Jack
Taylor, reporters for the Dallas Times Herald. That study examined
11,425 capital murders from 1977 to 1984 and concluded that "the killer
of a white is nearly three times more likely to be sentenced to death
than the killer of a black in the 32 states where the death penalty has
been imposed., 29 The study also disclosed that in Maryland, killers of
white victims were eight times more likely to receive the death sentence
than killers of black victims; that in Arkansas, killers of white victims
were six times more likely to receive a sentence of death; and that in
Texas, killers of white victims were five times as likely to be sentenced
to death than killers of blacks." Even more compelling, the General
Accounting Office synthesized 28 different studies and found "a pattern
of evidence indicating racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, and
imposition of the death penalty after the Furman decision" in its
February 1990 report.3'
Furthermore, it appears that federal prosecutions reflect this same
racial disparity in that federal prosecutors target blacks far more often
than whites when seeking the death penalty for drug-related murders.32
The House Judiciary Committee's civil and constitutional rights
subcommittee reported in March 1994, that in the thirty-seven cases
where federal prosecutors had sought the death penalty, twenty-nine
were against blacks. Four others were against whites and four were
27. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987). See also, Ronald J. Tabak, Is
Racism Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act be Enacted to Substantially
Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing?, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & S. CHANGE 777,
780-81 (1990-91).
28. See id. at 780 n.9.
29. Jim Henderson & Jack Taylor, Killers of Dallas Blacks Escape the Death Penalty,
DALLAS TIMES HERALD, Nov. 17, 1985, at 1. See also, Tabak, supra note 27, at 780 n.10.
30. Id.
31. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (Feb. 1990). The Report
concluded that "[i]n 82 percent of the studies, race of victim was found to influence the
likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty, i.e., those who
murdered whites were found to be more likely to be sentenced to death than those who
murdered blacks. This finding was remarkably consistent across data sets, states, data
collection methods, and analytic techniques." Id. (footnote omitted).
32. Report: Blacks Suffer Federal Death Penalty Bias, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 1994, § 1, at
[Vol. 79:731
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against Hispanic defendants.33 It is for these same reasons that Justices
Brennan,'M Marshall, 35 and most recently Justice Blackmun of the
United States Supreme Court have rejected the constitutionality of
capital punishment. Despite judicial efforts to devise legal formulae and
procedural rules, the death penalty remains "fraught with arbitrariness,
discrimination, caprice, and mistake., 36 Justice Blackmun has therefore
termed capital punishment "an experiment that has failed. '37 (And lest
you argue death to all first-degree murderers, like other hapless
individuals who betray their own ignorance,38 the Supreme Court struck
that down in Woodson v. North Carolina as violative of individualized
sentencing in 1976).39
33. Id.
34. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Death
is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong probability that it is
inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary society is virtually total; and there is no
reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than the less severe
punishment of imprisonment."). See also, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 229-31 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also, Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 240-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
36. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
37. From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.
For more than 20 years I have endeavored - indeed, I have struggled - along with
a majority of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend
more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather
than continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has
been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectual-
ly obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is
virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural rules or
substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitution-
al deficiencies.
Id. at 1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Rock County Assistant District Attorney Gerald A. Urbik, in a letter to the editor
of the WISCONSIN LAWYER criticized the death row advocacy of this author as follows:
"Wiseman contends that the death penalty cannot be administered in a nondiscriminatory
manner. This is untrue, however. If every murderer convicted of first-degree intentional
homicide was executed, there would be little if any room for discriminatory enforcement."
See This Prosecutor Wants the Death Penalty Reinstated, 69 WISCONSIN LAWYER 2 (June
1995). One would hope that prosecutors who seek the reinstatement of capital punishment
in Wisconsin would at least know the law.
39. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,303-05 (1976) (respect for human dignity
underlying the Eighth Amendment requires judicial consideration of individual aspects of the
defendant's character and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of imposing the penalty of death; because the North Carolina
statute impermissibly treats all persons convicted of a designated offense as members of a
faceless, undifferentiated mass, it is unconstitutional).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
There are other, equally compelling inequities that account for many
of these egregious errors. As noted above, they are in large measure the
product of a lack of resources, including those resources necessary to
hire competent counsel. In Billy Gardner's case, his trial counsel had
visited with him for fifteen minutes at most before jury selection in this
capital case. Gardner informed us of that fact during our initial
interview with him, but trial counsel had countered that the visits were
much longer and more frequent. When we subpoenaed the jail records,
we knew Billy had told us the truth. Those records reflected but one
brief visit between the date of Gardner's arrest and the date of jury
selection. Nor did trial counsel bother to interview witnesses at the
scene who were listed on the police incident report.
Furthermore, although trial counsel knew that Billy Gardner was a
drug addict, they were not aware prior to trial that he was a victim of
what one doctor has since termed "catastrophic" child abuse, having
been injected with heroin by his father at the age of nine to make him
a pliant drug runner. There was no mental health expert and no
opportunity to investigate the impact of those mitigating circumstances
on Gardner's moral culpability for the offense. Gardner's sister
responded to the family's dissatisfaction with trial counsel by investigat-
ing the costs of retaining private counsel. Yet she stopped her efforts
when told that the minimum fee for a capital case like her brother's was
$30,000.40 But, of course, Billy Gardner is not alone.
The stories of ineffective assistance in capital cases are legion. While
awaiting our client's execution in the wee morning hours of February 16,
the chaplain at the Walls Unit in Huntsville told us that one Texas
lawyer had ten clients currently facing execution in Huntsville. The Wall
Street Journal, on September 7, 1994, reported that the strategy of Texas
lawyer Joe Frank Cannon in capital cases was simple: "Work fast."41
Mr. Cannon told reporter Paul Barrett that "'[j]uries don't like a lot of
questioning, all these jack-in-the-box objections, going into every detail,
40. Texas has some public defenders, but for the most part, counsel in capital cases are
appointed by the individual trial judges. See Marcia Coyle, et al., Trial and Error in the Na-
tion's Death Belt: Fatal Defense, 12 NAT'L. L.J. 29, 32 (June 11, 1990). See also, Lewin, supra
note 13, at A13. Texas requires no special training or qualification for capital defense lawyers
and provides no counsel beyond the first appeal. Id.
41. See Paul M. Barrett, On the Defense: Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises
Doubts About System, WALL STREET J., Sept. 7, 1994, § A, at 1.
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so I've never done it."'42 Instead, he boasts of hurrying through trials
"'like greased lightning."'43 Appointed by the Texas courts to represent
defendants in capital cases at state expense, Cannon has defended eight
men who are currently awaiting execution. His collection of ten death
sentences is reportedly one of the largest among active defense
lawyers.' Apparently proud that he spends little time at his office or
the law library, Mr. Cannon also boasted, "'I'm not the sort of lawyer
who takes a lot of notes."'45 A 1995 CNN televised presentation
entitled, "On Penalty of Death," reported that in Harris County, Texas,
the same county where Mr. Cannon has practiced law for 44 years,46
fifteen people were sentenced to death in 1994. In each of those cases,
the defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel. In another
fifteen capital cases where the defendants had privately retained counsel,
the district attorney never sought the death penalty in any one of
them.47
Texas, however, is not the only state to have problems with
incompetent lawyers in capital cases. Take the case of former lawyer
James Venable in Alabama, reported in the February 1991 issue of the
ABA Journal. When Aden Harrison Jr. was tried for murder in March
1986, he was represented by Mr. Venable, who was then 83 years old.
According to the Fulton County Superior Court, Mr. Venable "slept a
'good deal' of the time."'  Harrison's family, which is black, chose
Venable because of his low fees. What they did not know was that James
Venable was a former imperial wizard of the Ku Klux Klan. Asked by
a reporter to confirm the allegation, Venable remarked, "'I've been in
the Klan since 1923, when it was over 10 million strong."'4 9
In order to assess the quality of legal defense in capital cases in the
nation's Death Belt, i.e., Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi and Texas, the National Law Journal in 1990 conducted a




45. Id. at A4.
46. Id.
47. Harris County, which includes the city of Houston, accounted for 113 of the 397
inmates on Texas' death row in 1995. Of the Texas inmates executed since 1976,37 were from
Harris County, where District Attorney Johnny B. Holmes, Jr., pronounces himself a "proud
supporter of the death penalty." Lewin, supra note 13, at Al, A13.
48. Paul Marcotte, Snoozing, Unprepared Lawyer Cited, ABA J., Feb. 1991, at 14.
49. Id.
50. See Coyle, supra note 40, at 29-42.
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examined thousands of transcript pages in nearly 100 trials; interviewed
scores of attorneys who had tried and lost capital cases; and questioned
judges, prosecutors and experts in capital law. Its key findings include
the following: (1) trial lawyers who represented death row inmates in the
particular six states have been disbarred, suspended or otherwise
disciplined at a rate 3 to 46 times the discipline rates for those states; (2)
more than half the defense counsel surveyed were handling their first
capital case when their clients were convicted; (3) unrealistic statutory
fee limits on defense representation act as disincentives to thorough trial
investigation and preparation; (4) there are inadequate or non-existent
standards for appointment of counsel which sometimes result in widely
varying levels of experience in capital cases; (5) extant statutory
standards for appointment of counsel are routinely ignored by trial
judges and violations are viewed on appeal as "harmless error;" (6)
capital trials are often completed in one to two days; (7) penalty phases
of capital trials commence immediately after the guilt phase and last
several hours at best; (8) little effort is expended to present mitigating
evidence at the penalty phase; and (9) the Supreme Court test for
effective assistance of counsel as articulated in Strickland v. Washing-
ton 5 is applied in meaningless fashion to capital cases. 52 The study
concluded that "fairness is more like the random flip of a coin than a
delicate balancing of the scales of justice."53
Moreover, at a time when Congress and the states are expanding
their efforts to implement capital punishment, they are also cutting back
on defense costs. For example, Congress has voted now to defund the
Resource Centers across this country which operated in twenty of the
death penalty states. These centers not only represented death row
inmates directly, they also trained private lawyers to do the same. 4 In
the state of Wisconsin, a growing number of legislators want to reinstate
capital punishment, yet they sought to reduce funding for the office of
the State Public Defender by $22 million. Whom do they expect will
represent the bulk of the capital defendants? Politicized legislatures seek
to reduce defense costs but only at the expense of justice for the poor
and the innocent. And how many "innocent" death row inmates will it
take before the public's lust for blood is sated?
51. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
52. Coyle, supra note 40, at 30.
53. Id.
54. See Henry J. Reske, The Politics of Death: Dispute Over Defender Organizations
Mirrors Debate Over Death Penalty, ABA J., Nov. 1995, at 20.
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C. THE LENGTHY REVIEW PROCESS
To many proponents of capital punishment, the efficacy of death is
lost in a stream of endless delay caused by defense counsel's attempt to
pursue successive petitions for writ of habeas corpus. The response is
somehow to streamline the post-conviction system in order to execute
more quickly. Some have even suggested that my own seven-year
odyssey was much too long. Actually, mine is a story of judicial largesse
that extended not to defense counsel, as many would believe, but to the
State.
My story begins on February 15, 1988, almost seven years to the date
before Billy Gardner was executed. I was asked to take Billy's case by
a friend of mine5 who was hired by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
to organize death row representation and who feared that Billy Gardner
faced an imminent writ of execution without benefit of counsel. On
February 26, 1988, I received a copy of the 4,000 page record in the
Gardner case from a kindly lady with the Salvation Army who minis-
tered to the death row inmates in Huntsville. She and her son spent
days copying the record and sent it to me via Greyhound Bus. I was
fortunate to have her assistance because on the same day I received the
record, I was notified that the trial judge had ordered Mr. Gardner
executed on March 22, only a month away.
From February 19 until April 14, 1988, when I was finally successful,
I attempted to locate a local Texas attorney who would agree to appear
in the case with me because I was not licensed to practice law in Texas.
I spent a minimum of one hour per day in that endeavor, calling
everyone from Esther Lardent, the Director of the ABA Death Penalty
Representation Project (which was then in its fledgling stages) to the
Texas Civil Liberties Union. The former could offer but two suggestions;
the latter could barely return my call. No one would touch the case.
When I could wait no longer, I filed a petition seeking an emergency
stay of execution until I could file for habeas corpus relief in the Texas
trial court. That stay was granted on March 15, 1988 for a period of 60
days. The State of Texas responded on March 30 with a motion to
vacate the stay and, summarily remand the case to the trial court for
immediate imposition of a death date. The State had argued that my
filing a petition for emergency stay constituted the unauthorized practice
55. Reference is to Attorney James A. Rebholz, now a partner with the Milwaukee firm
of Rebholz. Auberry & Malone.
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of law, because my papers were filed without the signature of local
counsel. I was struck by the paradox: the district attorney's office in
Dallas wanted to protect Mr. Gardner from potentially incompetent out-
of-state counsel by killing him.
I eventually secured local counsel56 and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the stay of execution on April 18, 1988. Judge Teague
of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted in his order that the
Texas bar could not on the one hand disdain to represent its own death
row inmates and on the other object to volunteer counsel from other
states.
57
I then filed for permission to appear in Mr. Gardner's case pro hac
vice; the order granting permission was issued on May 12, 1988. I read
the 4,000 page transcript and made plans to travel to Texas to investigate
the case. Local counsel was successful in hiring an independent
investigator in the process. I also obtained the services of two excellent
third-year law students to work with me on the case58 and accepted the
volunteer services of another dedicated Wisconsin lawyer 9 because we
were running out of time. The stay of execution had since expired and
the trial judge had set another execution date for July 20, 1988.
We filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court together
with another request for stay of execution on July 13, 1988. We also
requested an evidentiary hearing because there were serious issues of
ineffective trial counsel and the constitutionality of the Texas death
scheme as implemented, 60 not to mention questions regarding the
assailant's description. Shortly after July 13, I received a phone call from
the Texas appellate district attorney who had been assigned the case.
56. He was Attorney Keith E. Jagmin of Dallas, Texas. We remain indebted for his
efforts as well.
57. He also noted that I probably wished I had never heard of the State of Texas and
he, for one, would not blame me if I felt that way.
58. These were David Bourne, noted above, and Francis J. Hughes, now with the
Milwaukee law firm of Fox, Carpenter, O'Neill & Shannon, S.C.
59. I am, of course, indebted to Atty. Edward J. Hunt of the Edward J. Hunt Law
Offices in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, then a supervising attorney with the Legal Defense Program
at the University of Wisconsin Law School. My gratitude extends as well to my Marquette
Law School colleagues, many of whom spent hours at the copy machine until the wee hours
of the morning aiding my efforts to seek emergency stays, or who contributed money, from
their own pockets to help finance my various trips to Texas.
60. We consistently argued that, as applied, Section 37.01 of the Texas Criminal Code
violated Gardner's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights since there was relevant
mitigating evidence of which the capital jury could make no use. Eventually, we argued that
undisputed evidence of catastrophic childhood abuse introduced during mitigation brought
Gardner's case within the purview of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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She told me that she had spoken with the judge and that initially he was
not going to grant the evidentiary hearing. However, because she had
her own serious reservations about Mr. Gardner's case, she convinced
the trial judge to order a hearing. I was grateful for her efforts,6
notwithstanding the fact that they were all ex parte. We were to discover
that at virtually every stage of the proceedings, Texas prosecutors had no
ethical obligation to include defense counsel in substantive discussions
with judges about the merits of a case. The judge thereafter issued a
stay of execution and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. That evidentiary
hearing occurred on October 20 and 21, 1988, and was adjourned for
completion to December 12 and 13, 1988.
One of the more interesting developments emanating from those
hearings was the surprising testimony of both the original investigator
and the district attorney who tried Gardner in 1983. Each testified that
Billy Gardner had orally confessed to the offense and had done so weeks
before trial.62 Yet, as trial had commenced on October 17, 1983, that
same district attorney represented to the court in response to a defense
motion for defendant's statements that "[t]here's [sic] no written
confessions of the Defendant. There's no oral confessions "of the
Defendant, whether recorded or not., 63 We were left to assume that
the confession evidence had been manufactured to somehow account for
trial counsel's failure to investigate the facts of the case. The presiding
judge took judicial notice of the obvious contradiction in the state
attorney's testimony, but never again referred to it.
By December 15, 1988, we had submitted 33 pages of proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State responded with ten on
December 20. On December 29, the day before his departure to the
appellate bench, the presiding trial judge issued his findings of fact and
conclusions of law. They were but four pages long. In his brief findings,
there was no mention of the district attorney's changed testimony, no
citation to the record, and no attempt to cite the law. The only finding
with respect to the lead trial lawyer's failure to investigate his own case
was the judge's statement that trial counsel had "ample opportunity to
meet with and communicate with the defendant personally, through the
61. And I remain indebted to the efforts of then Assistant District Attorney Leslie
McFarlane of Dallas, who sometimes joined in the investigative efforts regarding the Gardner
case, insofar as she was able. It is my understanding that she left the Dallas prosecutor's office
for personal reasons following her attempts to implement the release of Randall Dale Adams
in 1989.
62. Evidentiary Hr'g Tr. at 530-32, 534-35.
63. Trial Tr., Vol. 16, at 22.
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investigator, and through relatives. He is very competent and experi-
enced. As he testified, he had sufficient time, evidence and was
prepared for trial."' The state trial judge then forwarded our petition
to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which likewise denied it on
February 24, 1989, with three judges dissenting. The trial judge then set
another execution date for March 9, 1989.
Following our loss in state court, we filed our first and only petition
for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. That was on March
1, 1989. We again raised constitutional issues about the adequacy of the
Texas death scheme and sought permission to hire a psychological
expert. We also filed for a stay of execution. The State of Texas was
ordered to file its response to our habeas petition by April 25, 1989.
Without explanation or word to us from either the State or the federal
district court, the State did not file any response until February 23, 1990
- nearly one year later and months beyond the appointed date. It also
filed a motion for summary judgment. We moved to strike the State's
response because it was so late. That motion, of course, was denied
without explanation. The court also denied our motion to order a
psychiatric examination for our client, so we paid the doctor ourselves.
We then won an evidentiary hearing in federal court in order to present
psychological testimony regarding Billy Gardner's moral blameworthiness
for the offense. That hearing was held on September 23, 1991. The
magistrate issued no findings, however, until February 19, 1993. After
filing our objections to the magistrate's determination, we filed an appeal
in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on May 28, 1993. Although our
supporting brief was due on July 25, we filed it on July 22. The State's
brief was due on August 20. Despite an admonition from the Fifth
Circuit that delays would only be tolerated for good cause, which would
not include the ordinary business of counsel, the State was granted an
extension of time to September 13, 1993.
After our brief was filed but before the State's brief was due, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had decided a case virtually identical to
ours in which the defendant was awarded a new sentencing hearing. The
decision in Russell v. Collins65 was issued on August 13, 1993, and was
required to be cited by the State in its brief under applicable rules of
professional conduct. It was not. The Fifth Circuit imposed no sanction
and the court never mentioned the omission.
64. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law No. 11, Ex Parte Billy Conn Gardner, Writ
No. W83-93161-R, 265th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, December 29, 1988.
65. 998 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1993).
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Then, on September 21, 1993, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Motley v. Collins,66 which again
stood as precedent affording our client and those similarly situated a new
trial. On April 1, 1994, however, those same three judges withdrew their
opinion and substituted a new opinion reaching precisely the opposite
conclusion 67 - a situation so rare it is almost without equal. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently issued a two-page per curiam
opinion in our case on April 14, 1994, denying us any relief. We filed a
petition for rehearing on April 25, 1994. That petition was likewise
denied by the Fifth Circuit on May 13. The Fifth Circuit then vacated
all stays of execution.
On August 5, 1994, we filed a petition for certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court. The State's response was due in the United
States Supreme Court on September 8, 1994. On September 7, they
sought and obtained an extension to October 11. On October 10, they
sought and obtained an extension to November 10. On November 10,
they sought and obtained an extension of time to December 9, and were
finally told by the Clerk of the Supreme Court that no further extensions
would be entertained. Each of their extensions was allegedly necessitat-
ed by "a number of other previous commitments of the undersigned
attorney, including administrative responsibilities." The "rarity" of that
excuse is perhaps matched only by the paucity of courts which accept it.
In retrospect, it appears not a little disingenuous that Justice Antonin
Scalia, the assigned administrative justice for the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, will no longer entertain the lack of a lawyer as "good cause"
for which to extend the time within which a capital defendant must file
a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.6"
Yet the State of Texas can obtain repeated and successive extensions of
time within which to file a 19-page responsive brief without apparent
justification.
Gardner's petition for certiorari was eventually denied by Supreme
Court order on January 9, 1995. On January 12, the Texas trial judge set
another execution date for February 16. We turned the files over to the
66. 3 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 1993). The Fifth Circuit there determined that substantial
evidence of childhood abuse introduced at trial properly preserved a Penry claim for collateral
review and declined to require a strict nexus or expert testimony that the abuse suffered by
a capital defendant probably caused the defendant to commit the crime in question in order
to warrant a Penry instruction.
67. Motley v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1994).
68. See Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Chilling Capital Appeals: Scalia Ruling Makes
It Harder to Find Attorneys, 13 NATL. L. J., Mar. 11, 1991, at 1, 24.
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Texas Resource Center to assure ourselves that there was no further
legal issue which could be pursued. The Resource Center petitioned for
executive clemency on February 9, 1995, and within seven days, Billy
Gardner was dead.
Billy Gardner was hardly the beneficiary of a system manipulated by
defense counsel. To suggest greater restrictions on time and issues
without seeking parity from prosecutors is folly. If the sanction for the
defendant is a hastened death, the State must at least lose the right to be
heard. Yet repeatedly, the State faces no sanction at all.
D. THE "ECONOMICS" OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Beyond the powerful evidence which suggests that the death penalty
cannot be meted out fairly as between black and white, rich and poor,
there are other concerns. When the United States Supreme Court
reinstated capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia, it recognized that
contemporary values reflected in public attitudes toward a given
punishment played a role in Eighth Amendment analysis and applica-
tion.69 However, public perceptions of standards of decency do not
conclude the constitutional analysis.7" The penalty for an offense also
must accord with "the dignity of man."'" That is, a punishment may
not be excessive;72 it may not involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain, nor may it be grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime.73 Furthermore, in order to obviate the "unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain," the sanction or penalty imposed cannot be so
totally devoid of penological justification that it results in the gratuitous
infliction of suffering.74 It is at this juncture that deterrence becomes
significant.
The Supreme Court responded to the issue of penological justification
69. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
70. Id. ("[O]ur cases also make clear that public perceptions of standards of decency with
respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive.").
71. In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court had concluded that the cruel and unusual
punishments clause of the eighth amendment "'must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' Furman, 408 U.S. 238,
269-70 (1971) (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J. concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100-101 (1958)). "The Clause 'may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice."' Id. at 270 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 378 (1910)).
72. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 183.
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by suggesting two purposes for the death penalty: retribution and
deterrence. However, while retribution is not a forbidden objective, nor
one which is inconsistent with prevailing constitutional standards, it is no
longer the dominant objective of American criminal law.75 Considered
in light of this legitimate objective, capital punishment has been viewed
as an expression of society's outrage at particularly offensive conduct. 6
The constitutional question as yet unresolved is whether retribution
alone suffices to bring a particular punishment in compliance with the
Eighth Amendment. Thus, the proponents' insistence on deterrence. If
indeed capital punishment serves no deterrent function or is no more a
deterrent to violent crime than life imprisonment without possibility of
parole, it may not withstand constitutional scrutiny. As Justice Marshall
wrote in Furman:
The fact that the State may seek retribution against those who
have broken its laws does not mean that retribution may then
become the State's sole end in punishing. Our jurisprudence has
always accepted deterrence in general, deterrence of individual
recidivism, isolation of dangerous persons, and rehabilitation as
proper goals of punishment. Retaliation, vengeance, and
retribution have been roundly condemned as intolerable aspira-
tions for a government in a free society.
Punishment as retribution has been condemned by scholars for
centuries, and the Eighth Amendment itself was adopted to prevent
punishment from becoming synonymous with vengeance."
Indeed, Justice Marshall's sentiments are also reflected in the
determination of the newly-created South African Supreme Court, which
abolished capital punishment on June 6, 1995.7" Announcing the
unanimous decision of the court, Mr. Arthur Chaskalson, President of
the Constitutional Court, stated:
Retribution cannot be accorded the same weight under our
Constitution as the right to life and dignity.... It has not been
shown that the death sentence would be materially more effective
to deter or prevent murder than the alternative sentence of life
imprisonment.79
75. Id. (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)).
76. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184.
77. Furman, 408 U.S. at 238 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
78. Howard W. French, South Africa's Supreme Court Abolishes Death Penalty, N.Y.




As noted by Mr. Chaskalson, there is serious question whether capital
punishment acts as a deterrence, either to society in general or to the
individual criminal. The F.B.I publication Crime in the United States
demonstrates that 1994 murder rates in states which do not have the
death penalty averaged 3.85 murders per 100,000 of population, while
states which use the death penalty averaged 8.07 murders."0
Furthermore, capital punishment is more costly than any other
option, including life imprisonment. North Carolina conducted a
comprehensive study on the issue which was published in 1993.
According to that study, North Carolina taxpayers pay $163,000 more to
convict and execute an inmate than they do to convict and imprison an
inmate for twenty years."' Estimates are that each execution in North
Carolina costs the state approximately $2.16 million.' The Miami
Herald has similarly reported that the State of Florida spends $3.2
million per execution. 3 Likewise, the Kansas Legislative Research
Department has concluded that capital trials can last up to three-and-
one-half times as long as non-capital trials, and in California, capital
trials cost nearly six times more than other murder trials.' Texas
taxpayers similarly spend an estimated $2.3 million for each capital
prosecution, which is three times the cost of incarcerating an inmate in
a maximum security prison for forty years.8 As of 1993, Maryland has
followed suit at a cost of approximately $2 million each year.8 6 And
finally, the State of New York estimates that costs incurred for attorneys'
fees, investigators, experts and other trial and appellate costs would
equal nearly $1.7 million per capital case.87
Comparable estimates for the cost of life imprisonment are much
reduced. A 1985 California study estimated that sentencing a murderer
80. See Crime in the United States 1994 (Uniform Crime Reports) 60-67 (Nov. 19, 1995),
published by the United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Statis-
tics were calculated by averaging the 1994 murder rates per 100,000 population of those states
which have the death penalty and the 1994 murder rates per 100,000 population of those states
which do not have capital punishment.
81. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 5, at 84.
82. Id.
83. D. Von Drehl, Bottom Line: Life in Prison One-sixth as Expensive, MIAMI HERALD.
July 10, 1988, § A, at 12.
84. See Wisconsin Department of Justice Fiscal Estimate, LRB 0270/1 SB1 (Jan. 26,
1995), at p. 3.
85. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 5, at 84.
86. Id. at 85.
87. Wisconsin Department of Justice Fiscal Estimate, supra note 84, at 3.
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to life imprisonment would cost approximately $440,000, whereas the
New York State Defenders Association in 1982 estimated the cost of life
imprisonment for forty years at just over $600,000.
E. THE MORAL "COSTS" OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
With the abolition of capital punishment in South Africa on June 6,
1995 ,9 the United States stands as one of only two industrialized
nations which execute their citizens.' In this regard. the United States
is allied with such stalwarts as China, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Russia and
Singapore.9' Most damning of all, however, we execute our children92
and we execute our mentally infirm.
Of the thirty-eight states which endorse capital punishment, sixteen
authorize imposition of the death penalty as against juvenile offenders
below the age of eighteen.93 Nine states express no minimum age for
the imposition of capital punishment, and three permit executions for
offenders as young as fourteen or fifteen. 94
The United States Supreme Court first confronted the constitutional-
ity of executing juveniles in Eddings v. Oklahoma.' Although the
Court there was able to avoid considering the issue of the defendant's
age because the trial court had refused as a matter of law to consider
other relevant mitigating evidence,96 it faced the issue squarely six years
later in Thompson v. Oklahoma.97 In Thompson, a five-member
plurality of the Court reversed the death penalty as assessed against a
88. STATE OF WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 25, at 18.
89. French, supra note 78.
90. See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 5, at 685, 703.
91. Id. Even Russia, however, has only about 400 death row prisoners. That is one for
every 370,000 Russians. By contrast, the United States has more than 2,700 death row
prisoners. This represents one death row prisoner for every 97,000 Americans. See On Death
Row, It's Wait, Wait, Wait, THE MILWAUKEE J., Dec. 28, 1992. § A, at 5.
92. For an excellent discussion of the issues surrounding the juvenile death penalty, see
Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of the Child?, 26 Loy. U.
CHI. Li. 147 (1995).
93. These are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia,
and Wyoming. See STATE OF WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, BULL. 95-1,
supra note 25, at 26-7.
94. Id. The latter group includes Arkansas (14), Louisiana (15) and Virginia (15).
95. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
96. Id. at 112-13. The court ruled that the trial judge had violated the constitutional
premise of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), when it refused as a matter of law to consider
Eddings' turbulent family history and serious emotional disturbance.
97. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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fifteen-year-old defendant, but only four members of the majority found
that the execution of anyone under the age of sixteen was unconstitu-
tional as against contemporary values.98
The Oklahoma statute at issue authorized capital punishment for
murder, but did not specify any minimum age at which the commission
of murder might lead to the imposition of death.9 9 The plurality
reasoned that evolving standards of decency, as reflected by state statutes
and the sentencing patterns of capital juries, prohibited the execution of
a person under the age of sixteen at the time of his or her offense' 0
Its conclusion in this regard was supported by the juvenile's reduced
culpability and the failure of the penological purposes of retribution or
deterrence when the penalty of death is exacted against such young
offenders."'
However, at least one justice who joined in reversing the sentence
was reserved about the breadth of the Thompson holding. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor noted that because Oklahoma's statutes did not
specify a minimum age for capital punishment, yet separately provided
that fifteen-year-old murder defendants might be treated as adults in
some circumstances, there existed a risk that the Oklahoma legislature
did not intend that the waiver of a juvenile into adult court should also
expose the juvenile to capital punishment." Under such circumstanc-
es, the execution of a fifteen-year-old could not be constitutional. She
intimated, however, that where that risk is obviated by a statute which
specifies a minimum age for the imposition of capital punishment, the
execution of younger offenders might yet be constitutional.0 3 More-
over, in Stanford v. Kentucky," decided less than two years later, the
Supreme Court used the same factors delineated in Thompson to arrive
at a determination that there exists no national consensus against
sentencing to death juveniles who are sixteen or seventeen years of age
at the time of the offense.
According to statistics compiled by Amnesty International in 1994,
98. These were Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun.
99. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 821-33.
101. Id. at 833-38.
102. See id. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
103. See id. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring). ("In this unique situation, I am
prepared to conclude that petitioner and others who were below the age of 16 at the time of
their offense may not be executed under the authority of a capital punishment statute that
specifies no minimum age at which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the
offender's execution.").
104. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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only seven countries had executed persons under the age of eighteen for
capital crimes within the previous five years. These included Iran, Iraq,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen - and the United States.1 5
Moreover, although the United Nations General Assembly had passed
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on November 20, 1989,106 the
United States did not sign the Convention until February 16, 1995.'07
Among the Convention's provisions is Article 37(a), which provides that
"[n]either capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility
of release shall be imposed for offenses committed by persons below
eighteen years of age... .""i Although 181 other nations have done
so, the United States Senate has yet to ratify the Convention, 9 which
has been opposed by various senators who cite the death penalty
prohibition, among others."0
The United States' stance on the execution of juveniles has also
subjected it to criticism from international human rights experts. When
it acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in
1992, the United States reserved, as against Article 6 of the Covenant,
the right to impose capital punishment on "persons below 18 years of
age." 1. The United States Government had argued that its reservation
expressed the will of the majority and was constitutional. When filing its
responsive report before members of the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, however, committee member R N. Ghagwati of India
chastened John Shattuck, Assistant United States Secretary of State.
Ghagwati argued that defending the death penalty as a democratic
105. See Robert A. Jordan, A Cry for Death - To the Death Penalty, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 23, 1994, Focus, at 71. Amnesty International had argued that "the USA is one of only
seven countries worldwide to have executed people in the last five years for crimes committed
while they were still minors under 18 - the others are Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and Yemen."
106. G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/Res44/25 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448,1456-76
(1989), addendum in 29 I.L.M. 1340 (1990).
107. Madeleine Albright, United States designate to the United Nations signed the
Convention on Thursday, February 16, 1995. U.S. Finally Signs Pact on Rights for Children,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 17, 1995, at A12.
108. See supra note 107.
109. See David L. Rubin, Helping Children, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 19, 1996, Commentary, at
18.
110. See Jessie Helms, Senator, Senate Foreign Relations, Congressional Press Release,
June 14, 1995. Sixteen other senators joined Senator Helms calling on President Clinton not
to send the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child to the Senate.
111. See Frank Ching, U.S. Role on Rights Reversed: UN Committee Members Criticize
Washington's Record, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 22, 1995, at 40.
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expression of the majority was "an explanation but not a justifica-
tion.""' 2 Similar objections to the United States report were lodged by
representatives from Chile, Australia, Cyprus and Venezuela. The latter
cautioned that the United States "should not end up being the last
country to ensure the fundamental right to life.""' 3
Consistent with its ambivalence toward juvenile executions, the
United States Supreme Court refused to ban the execution of mentally
disabled persons in Penry v. Lynaugh."4 Rejecting public opinion polls
conducted in Florida and Georgia as well as the arguments of the
American Association on Mental Retardation, the Supreme Court
concluded that there existed insufficient evidence of a national consensus
against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses.
Thus, such executions could not be categorically prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment on that ground."5 Fearful that any such determination
would have a disempowering effect if applied in other areas of the
law,"6 the Court instead left to a case-by-case determination whether
individual mentally retarded defendants lacked "the cognitive, volitional
and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with
the death penalty."" 7 It is thus possible, under the American scheme,
to execute a person who is mentally retarded by clinical standards but
who is deemed by a jury to act with a legal degree of culpability.
F. SOME TOUGH FINAL QUESTIONS
Society has a moral right to protect itself, but if it can do so by
imprisoning its most dangerous members for life, the principle of
nonmaleficence certainly precludes it from doing any more. Though
some would argue that life without possibility of parole is less merciful
than death," 8 I have yet to converse with a death row inmate who
would trade the continued hope of a claim of innocence for the
opportunity to end it all. And somehow, a moral society must find a way
to deal with its "problems," particularly its "problem children," short of
exterminating them.
A person with far more experience than I has cogently expressed
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
115. Id. at 335.
116. Id. at 340,
117. Id. at 338.
118. See Peter Kendall & Paul Galloway, The Quality of Mercy: Life Sentence Strains
Meaning of Clemency, CHI. TRIB., § 1, at 1.
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these sentiments. Sister Helen Prejean, author of Dead Man Walk-
ing" 9 and consultant for the movie of the same name,120 responded
during an interview that capital punishment is an act of murder which
contributes to the moral deterioration of society. In her words, it "let[s]
the behavior of the criminal be the norm which we imitate."'121 She
also reserves a just anger for the politicians who pander to the public's
fear of crime by "celebrating" a few cases when they know capital
punishment is void of any deterrent value." "'It keeps them from
having to deal with the real sources of crime [such as poverty], which are
complex and long-term. ' 12
With the increased public fervor to kill criminals and kill them sooner
after conviction, we clearly run the increased risk of executing the
wrongfully convicted. To my Christian brethren, I offer this analogy:
He stood before Pontius Pilate, accused of high treason and
blasphemy - proclaiming Himself a King in derogation of Caesar
and of Herod. The State had its laws, and the people of Judea
agreed that they were just laws. After all, it was important to the
survival of those people that they be protected from proffigate
kings who might form sinister groups of zealots and threaten the
welfare of the State. Some might argue that treason to such a
society was as significant a crime as murder is to us. And so
evidence was taken before the Sanhedrin and before the Procura-
tor Pilate. And the public sought its just sentence under the law
- death.
Was it a legitimate exercise of state power under the Law?
Of course. Was it carried out according to the technicality
demanded by the Law? Absolutely. Was there evidence to
support the conviction? Beyond a reasonable doubt. Did the
people of Judea act within their rights to demand His death to
assuage the outrage committed against their society? Surely. Just
as our society purports to act within its legal and moral rights
when it demands the death of one person to avenge another. Just
as Judean society demanded the death of Christ to avenge the
treason He had committed under their laws. It is fair for us; it
was fair for them.
119. SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING (1993).
120. James Rowen, Hope and the Condemned, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 23, 1996,
at El.
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Under these circumstances, it seems to me there is only one
relevant question to ask: would we kill Him again?
And to those for whom that message holds no particular significance
but who are yet willing to risk sacrificing a few innocents to bring justice
to the guilty, I have this challenge. If you are indeed willing to take the
risk of killing an innocent, then you take it. You substitute your son,
your daughter, your brother, your innocent, for my client. Because his
mother and sister were not willing to take that risk.
